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	NOTE 
Missouri Abolishes the Corroboration Rule 
and the Destructive Contradictions Doctrine: 
A Victory for Victims of Sexual Assault? 
State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
KRISTEN L. STALLION 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since early common law, evidentiary doctrines have limited the weight 
factfinders may give to the testimony of victims who take the witness stand 
and retell the traumatizing details of their sexual assaults.  Two of these doc-
trines, the corroboration rule and the destructive contradictions doctrine, ex-
isted in Missouri until the summer of 2014.  The corroboration rule required 
additional evidence to support a sexual assault conviction if the victim’s tes-
timony was deemed so contradictory to physical evidence, surrounding cir-
cumstances, and common experience as to render it doubtful.1  Similarly, the 
destructive contradictions doctrine required corroboration to support a con-
viction if a victim’s testimony was self-destructive or in opposition to physi-
cal evidence.2  These rules reflected a patriarchal common law mentality and 
the continued subordination of women in a justice system that insisted the 
victims of sexual assault, who are most commonly women, are not as believ-
able as victims of other types of crimes.  Law enforcement officials, juries, 
and the public scrutinized each detail of an assault because even the slightest 
discrepancy or inconsistency would throw extreme doubt on the female vic-
tim’s testimony, which was not enough to support a conviction on its own. 
Similar evidentiary doctrines have been reformed and repealed across 
the nation.3  The change in the treatment of victims of sexual assaults can be 
credited in large part to the efforts of proponents of the second wave of femi-
nist reform that swept the nation in the 1970s and 1980s.4  Thankfully, juries 
are no longer instructed to view female sexual assault victims as wayward 
 
 B.S., Missouri State University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri 
School of Law, 2016.  Editor in Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2015-2016.  A sincere 
thank you to Professor Ben Trachtenberg for his witty guidance and support through-
out the writing and editing process. 
 1. See State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 2. See State v. Uptegrove, 330 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011), abrogat-
ed by Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208. 
 3. See, e.g., State v. Byers, 627 P.2d 788, 796 (Idaho 1981). 
 4. See infra Part V.B. 
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waifs whose minds are easily subject to impression and whose pasts are scru-
tinized and thought to be adequate blame for the trauma they have endured.  
Despite the abolition of the corroboration rule and destructive contradictions 
doctrine, however, these rules will continue to be effectively enforced by 
juries due to long-held beliefs on gender and sex norms.5  More is needed to 
adjust these misconceptions about women and rape.  Once juries abandon 
these misconceptions, there may be a substantial increase in the number of 
convictions and reports of rape in Missouri and throughout the United States. 
Part II of this Note explores the issue in the case at hand, State v. Porter, 
which has finally abolished both the corroboration rule and destructive con-
tradictions doctrine in Missouri sexual assault cases.  Next, Part III presents 
the archaic rationale behind the two doctrines and explores its development.  
Finally, in Part IV, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision to abolish these 
doctrines is dissected and the evolution of these evidentiary common law 
rules is analyzed in light of courts’ efforts to remove the high wall of doubt 
female victims must attempt to overcome. This analysis reveals that much 
still needs to be done in order to truly prevent sex and gender norms from 
continuing to enter the courtroom and burden prosecutions of sexual assault. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
On October 31, 2010, B.Y. (the “Grandmother”) was babysitting her 
three-year-old granddaughter, K.W., in a room K.W.’s mother rented in a 
rooming house managed by Sylvester Porter.6  The Grandmother fell asleep 
while watching K.W. and when she awoke, she found K.W. lying on Porter’s 
bed with her pants off and a shirtless Porter with his head between K.W.’s 
legs.7  The Grandmother took her granddaughter out of Porter’s room and 
asked what had happened.8  K.W. replied that Porter was “sniffing around 
down there” and “messing with her bottom part.”9  When K.W.’s mother 
returned home about one half hour after the Grandmother awoke from her nap 
and found K.W. in Porter’s room, K.W. told her mother that Porter had 
touched her vagina.10  K.W.’s mother then confronted Porter, who denied 
ever touching K.W.11  K.W. overheard Porter’s denial and told him, “[Y]es 
you did, you touched my kookoo.”12  K.W.’s mother subsequently called St. 
Louis City Police.13 
 
 5. See infra Part V.C. 
 6. State v. Porter, No. ED98908, 2013 WL 5628670, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 7. See id.; see also Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 210. 
 8. Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 210. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id.; see also Respondent’s Substitute Brief, State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 
(Mo. 2014) (en banc) (No. SC93851), 2014 WL 1572120, at *11. 
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On November 12, 2010, a forensic interviewer with Children Advocacy 
Services of Greater St. Louis (“CAC”) interviewed K.W.14  In the interview, 
K.W. volunteered that Porter was in jail after “he put his hand on her private 
part.”15  K.W. said she had told Porter to “stop, stop, stop, stop” but that Por-
ter kept touching her.16  K.W. was able to point to a drawing of the female 
anatomy to indicate Porter had touched her vagina.17  K.W. also told the in-
terviewer that Porter had touched her private part with his tongue, that Porter 
put “hot sauce” on her “kookoo,” and that Porter put his penis near her eye.18  
The State “charged Porter with two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy 
for touching K.W.’s vagina with his hand (Count I) and with his tongue 
(Count II).19  The State also charged Porter with one count of first-degree 
child molestation for touching K.W.’s head with his penis (Count III).”20 
Porter pled not guilty to all three charges, and the St. Louis City Circuit 
Court held a jury trial from July 9 to July 11, 2012;21 K.W. was five years old 
at the time she testified on July 10, 2012.22  In her testimony, K.W. stated that 
she knew Porter, but said she did not see him in the courtroom at that time.23  
K.W. said that Porter had “touched her ‘private part’ when she was younger 
and that this occurred in a different place than where she was then living.”24  
K.W. also stated that Porter “touched her with his hand and that he did not 
touch her private part with any other part of his body.”25  Porter called several 
witnesses, including a witness from the St. Louis Police Department’s crime 
laboratory, who testified that no seminal fluid was found on K.W.’s clothing 
or on K.W.’s vaginal swab.26  A forensic examiner from CAC testified that 
when she interviewed K.W.’s mother five days after the incident, the mother 
told her that K.W. cried and recanted when she saw Porter being arrested and 
that K.W. had said that the Grandmother made K.W. say that Porter touched 
her.27  K.W.’s mother also reported that the Grandmother had been drinking 
beer while watching K.W.28  The examiner replied on cross-examination by 
 
 14. Respondent’s Substitute Brief, supra note 13, at *11.  This interview was 
admitted into evidence as the State’s Exhibit 1 and was played for the jury at Porter’s 
trial.  Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at *12. 
 18. Id.; see also Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 210. 
 19. Respondent’s Substitute Brief, supra note 13, at *12. 
 20. Id. 
 21. State v. Porter, No. ED98908, 2013 WL 5628670, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
 22. Respondent’s Substitute Brief, supra note 13, at *13. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at *14. 
 28. Id. 
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the State that “it was possible a child might recant upon seeing someone 
get[ting] arrested, notwithstanding whether or not the incident occurred.”29 
Porter moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence, argu-
ing that the State did not make a submissible case after testimony was pre-
sented, stating that the Grandmother pressured K.W. to say Porter had 
touched her.30  The trial court denied Porter’s motions and submitted the case 
to the jury, who found Porter guilty on all three counts.31  The trial court sub-
sequently granted Porter’s motion for judgment of acquittal on his first-
degree child molestation charge (Count III) and sentenced Porter “to two 
concurrent terms of twenty-five years in the Missouri Department of Correc-
tions.”32 
On appeal, Porter contended that the trial court erred by overruling his 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence and convicting 
him on Count I (first-degree statutory sodomy) because K.W.’s trial testimo-
ny was inconsistent and contradictory and should have required corroboration 
in order to convict Porter.33  Porter also argued that the trial court erred in 
overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence 
and in convicting him of Count II (first-degree statutory sodomy) because 
K.W.’s “out-of-court statement that Porter touched her vagina with his tongue 
was inconsistent with, contradicted, and not corroborated by, her other out-of-
court statements that nobody touched any part of her body.”34  Additionally, 
Porter contended that the trial court erred by granting the jury’s request to 
observe all evidence and in sending K.W.’s CAC interview to the jury for 
review.35  Porter argued that K.W.’s statements on the tapes were testimonial 
evidence under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 491.075.1 and gave the 
jury the ability to listen to the recorded testimony as often as desired, which 
created the presumption that the recorded interview was to be given more 
weight.36 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District affirmed the trial 
court’s judgment sentencing Porter for two counts of first-degree statutory 
 
 29. Id. at *15. 
 30. Appellant’s Substitute Brief, State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc) (No. SC93851), 2014 WL 1234675, at *20-21. 
 31. State v. Porter, No. ED98908, 2013 WL 5628670, at *1 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).  
The jury requested all exhibits presented in trial in its deliberations, including the 
CAC video interview of K.W.  Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 214. 
 32. Porter, 2013 WL 5628670, at *1.  There was insufficient evidence that Por-
ter touched K.W.’s head with his penis.  Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 211.  On direct exam-
ination, K.W. testified that Porter only touched her private part with his hand and did 
not touch her with any other part of his body.  Appellant’s Substitute Brief, supra 
note 30, at *36. 
 33. Id. at *22. 
 34. Id. at *23. 
 35. Id. at *24. 
 36. Id. 
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sodomy.37  The appellate court denied Porter’s argument that the corrobora-
tion rule should be invoked because K.W.’s trial testimony was so contradic-
tory to her out-of court statement to the CAC interviewer.38  The court rea-
soned, “As noted by our Supreme Court, ‘inconsistent or contradictory state-
ments by a young child relating a sexual experience [do] not, in [themselves] 
deprive the testimony of all probative force.’”39  The court’s rationale was 
that just because K.W.’s testimony and out-of-court statements were incon-
sistent did not mean that her trial testimony was “so contradictory or incon-
sistent as to deprive it of all probative force” as the corroboration rule re-
quires.40  The court decided that “[a]ny contradictions or inconsistencies in 
K.W.’s testimony were properly weighed by the jury in their determination of 
her credibility.”41  As to Porter’s third argument, nothing in the record re-
flected whether the parties were notified of the jury’s request of all state and 
defense exhibits, videos, and lab reports or whether either party objected to 
the fulfillment of the jury’s request.42  Because the record did not indicate 
what happened after the jury’s request for exhibits, the court determined that 
“[i]n the absence of any record indicating what occurred at the trial court with 
respect to [the] claim of error, [it was] obligated to affirm the trial court.”43 
Porter again appealed his convictions for two counts of first-degree stat-
utory sodomy, contending the corroboration rule and destructive contradic-
tions doctrine entitled him to judgments of acquittal on the two counts be-
cause K.W.’s testimony was contradictory and lacked sufficient corrobora-
tion.44  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri abolished the corroboration 
rule and destructive contradictions doctrine “because, among other reasons, 
both require[d] appellate courts to act as the finder of fact,” which is incon-
sistent with the standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of evi-
dence.45 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The corroboration rule and the destructive contradictions doctrine have 
been in existence since early common law.46  Both rules were initially used to 
scrutinize the testimony of sexual assault victims and to guide factfinders in 
assessing the believability of victims.47  While the doctrines are similar, the 
 
 37. Porter, 2013 WL 5628670, at *5. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *3 (quoting State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. 1995) (en 
banc)). 
 40. Porter, 2013 WL 5628670, at *3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at *5. 
 43. Id. 
 44. State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 45. Id. at 210, 212-13. 
 46. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 47. See infra Part III.A-B. 
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corroboration requirement is strictly limited to sexual assault cases and is, 
therefore, more closely analyzed below.48 
A.  The Corroboration Rule 
1.  Early Examples of the Corroboration Rule in Missouri 
The use of the corroboration rule in sex crimes cases in Missouri can be 
observed as early as the nineteenth century.49  One such example, State v. 
Sibley, was decided in 1895, where the victim, Lula Hawkins, accused her 
stepfather of raping her as many as forty times.50  Lula testified at trial that 
her stepfather first raped her when she was between the ages of twelve and 
thirteen.51  Soon after, Lula reported the rape to her mother who then “told 
her that she would have to submit to [her stepfather’s] wishes or leave 
home.”52  It was later discovered that Lula was pregnant, and she was then 
banished from her home and given what she thought was medication to cause 
her to have an abortion.53  In its analysis, the court reasoned, “Corroborating 
evidence must proceed from extraneous sources, and not from the mouth of 
the witness, when on the stand.”54  Thus, Lula’s testimony alone was not 
enough to convict her stepfather.55 
At trial, the State presented witnesses on Lula’s behalf who testified that 
her stepfather had bad character for chastity and virtue.56  No evidence was 
presented to bolster Sibley’s character.57  In reversing the trial court’s judg-
ment convicting Lula’s stepfather of defiling and carnally knowing a female 
under eighteen years of age, the court disregarded evidence of her stepfather’s 
bad character, determining that “it is a matter of common knowledge that the 
bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect 
his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that of a 
woman.”58  The court then cited the likes of Lord Byron, Lord Somers, and 
Charles James Fox as men who had a weakness for sexual pleasure, but were 
nevertheless great and noble.59  A woman’s unchaste history was seen to have 
thrown doubt on her honesty and therefore the credibility of her testimony.60  
 
 48. See infra Part III.A-B. 
 49. See State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 170 (Mo. 1895) (en banc). 
 50. Id. at 168. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 170. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. Id. at 171. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See id. 
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Evidence of Lula’s previous sexual relationships was presented at trial in an 
effort to show that Lula was unchaste.61  Her testimony at trial was immedi-
ately doubted and seen as so contrary to the evidence presented that a convic-
tion required some other sort of corroborating evidence.62 
Prior to Sibley, in 1891 the Supreme Court of Missouri had held that be-
cause there was no adequate explanation for the delay of a sexual assault vic-
tim’s report of an assault, evidence of her report was to be excluded as highly 
improbable and contrary to the demeanor of “actual” sexual assault victims.63  
Because the victim’s reaction to her assault was considered so contrary to the 
reaction of a woman who actually had been raped, the court required corrobo-
ration.64  The court instructed the jury: “[I]n determining the degree of credit 
to be given to the evidence of the prosecutrix in regard to the alleged rape, it 
is competent to consider the conduct of the prosecuting witness at and about 
the time thereof.”65  In making this determination, juries were to consider the 
length of time between an alleged rape and the time a victim reported it, 
whether the victim stayed in the company of the defendant after the alleged 
offense without making a complaint, and the victim’s relationship and con-
duct with her non-accused husband after the alleged offense.66  The court 
quoted William Blackstone and his assessment of the credibility of sexual 
assault victims: “[T]he credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she is 
to be believed, must be left to the jury, upon the circumstances of fact that 
concur with her testimony,” thus giving rise to the need for evidence to cor-
roborate a sexual assault victim’s testimony.67  Blackstone further states, 
If she be of evil fame, and stand unsupported by others; if she con-
cealed the injury for any considerable time after she had opportunity 
to complain . . . and [if] she made no outcry . . . these and the like cir-
cumstances carry a strong . . . presumption that her testimony is false 
or feigned.68 
In its reliance on Blackstone, the court reasoned, “When an outrage has 
been committed on a woman, the instincts of her nature prompt her to make 
her wrongs known, and to seek sympathy and assistance.”69  The complaint 
was seen as a woman’s “natural expression of her feelings,”70 speaking in 
favor of the likelihood that the complained of offense actually occurred.  No 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 170. 
 63. State v. Patrick, 17 S.W. 666, 671 (Mo. 1891) (en banc). 
 64. See id. at 671-72. 
 65. Id. at 669. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 670 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 213). 
 68. Patrick, 17 S.W. at 670. 
 69. Id. at 670 (quoting Parker v. State, 10 A. 219, 220 (Md. 1887)). 
 70. Patrick, 17 S.W at 670-71. 
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consideration was given to the varying reactions of those who have experi-
enced traumatizing events. 
The court more clearly articulated an early interpretation of the corrobo-
ration rule in the 1908 case of State v. Goodale.71  There, the court stated: 
[I]t is the law of this state . . . that a conviction for rape may be sus-
tained upon the uncorroborated evidence of the outraged female[.]  [I]t 
is nevertheless equally well settled that the appellate court will closely 
scrutinize the testimony upon which the conviction was obtained, and, 
if it appears incredible and too unsubstantial to make it the basis of a 
judgment, will reverse the judgment.72 
This rule was refined in State v. Tevis, a 1911 case to which the Su-
preme Court of Missouri later gave credit for creating the corroboration 
rule.73  The court held that defendants can be convicted for rape or incest 
based on the uncorroborated evidence of the victim, “but when the evidence 
of such prosecutrix is of a contradictory nature, or when applied to the admit-
ted facts in the case her testimony is not convincing but leaves the mind of 
the court clouded with doubts, she must be corroborated, or the judgment 
cannot be sustained.”74  This standard appeared to be slightly less strict than 
Sibley’s requirement of corroborating evidence regardless of the contents of 
the victim’s testimony.75 
In Tevis, the victim testified that her father had both raped and molested 
her for a period of more than five years.76  The victim did not report the as-
saults to anyone until thirteen months after the last act and testified that she 
waited to report the actions only because she was afraid of her father.77  The 
court held that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to convict the 
victim’s father because it was uncorroborated and the court’s mind was 
clouded with doubt after defense counsel presented evidence of the victim’s 
disobedience toward her father.78  The court also found it highly unlikely that 
the victim’s father could continue to rape the victim for such an extended 
period of time without the victim’s mother discovering the assaults.79  The 
court believed the victim’s disobedience toward her father cast complete 
doubt on her contention that she did not tell her mother sooner because she 
was afraid of her father’s reaction.80 
 
 71. 109 S.W. 9 (Mo. 1908). 
 72. Id. at 11. 
 73. See State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208, 211 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 74. State v. Tevis, 136 S.W. 339, 341 (Mo. 1911). 
 75. Compare id. at 341 with State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 170 (Mo. 1895) (en 
banc). 
 76. Tevis, 136 S.W. at 341. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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In State v. Burton, decided in 1946, Burton relied on the corroboration 
rule set forth in Tevis when he appealed his conviction for rape based on the 
contention that the victim’s evidence at trial was “insufficient to sustain the 
verdict for the reason that the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix 
[was] contrary to common experiences of womanhood, [was] improbable, 
and [was] contradicted by other witnesses.”81  Burton specifically pointed to 
evidence that the victim was not hysterical or crying and did not report an 
alleged rape to passersby.82  The court found it difficult to believe that a 
woman would not cry or become even slightly hysterical if five men had ac-
tually forcibly raped her, and it held that the victim acted in a nature so con-
tradictory to the expected behavior of a woman who had been raped by five 
men that her testimony must be corroborated.83  The court reasoned, 
It is true that her pants were torn, yet there is no evidence that they 
were soiled.  It is true that [the doctor] testified that at some indefinite 
time she had had sexual relations with a man, but this testimony does 
not tend to corroborate her testimony that she was forcibly raped.  
These appellants denied her testimony that they had sexual relations 
with her at that time or at any other time, and the evidence showed 
that these appellants bore good reputations.84 
This holding reflects the notion in State v. Sibley that it is “common 
knowledge” that only a woman’s bad character for chastity affects her charac-
ter for truth – that women are less believable than men – and reaffirms the 
belief held by William Blackstone that courts can presume an alleged vic-
tim’s testimony is false when the witness makes no outcry and does not take 
advantage of an opportunity to report the attack.85 
2.  The Movement from a Corroboration Requirement 
More recently, Missouri courts have strictly limited the application of 
the corroboration rule and given more deference to judges and juries as the 
factfinders who are better able to assess the credibility of sexual assault vic-
tims.86  In State v. Silvey, a case decided in 1995, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri did not apply the corroboration rule as strictly as it had in the cases pre-
 
 81. State v. Burton, 196 S.W.2d 621, 621 (Mo. 1946), abrogated by State v. 
Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en banc); see id. at 622-23 (quoting Tevis, 136 
S.W. at 341). 
 82. Burton, 196 S.W.2d at 623. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895) (en banc); see also State v. 
Patrick, 17 S.W. 666, 671 (Mo. 1891) (en banc). 
 86. State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. 1995) (en banc), abrogated by 
State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
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viously mentioned.87  The court held that the victim’s testimony was not “so 
contradictory or inconsistent as to deprive it of all probative force.  Any con-
tradictions or inconsistencies were properly weighed by the jury in their de-
termination of [the victim’s] credibility.”88 
In State v. Silvey, a four-year-old victim, A.P., testified at trial that Sil-
vey touched her genitals with his hands, a gun, and a butterfly knife.89  Silvey 
appealed his conviction for two counts of sodomy, arguing there had been 
insufficient evidence to convict him because A.P.’s testimony had not been 
corroborated as required and was “so inconsistent and contradictory as to 
deprive it of any probative force.”90  While the court admitted that A.P.’s 
testimony was inconsistent and contradictory to an extent, “inconsistent or 
contradictory statements by a young child’s relation of a sexual experience 
[do] not, in [themselves], deprive the testimony of all probative force.”91  
Because A.P.’s testimony did not conflict with physical evidence, surround-
ing circumstances, and common experience, it was sufficient to sustain Sil-
vey’s convictions without corroboration.92 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District questioned the 
validity and continued purpose of the corroboration rule when it decided State 
v. Nelson in 1991, four years prior to the Supreme Court of Missouri’s reaf-
firmation of the rule in Silvey.93  Such questioning appeared in the dicta of 
Nelson, where the court stated: “Missouri courts of appeals have questioned 
the continued existence of [the corroboration rule].”94  Nelson relied on the 
corroboration rule when appealing his sexual assault convictions, arguing that 
the victim’s testimony at trial was too contradictory and unconvincing to 
stand without corroborating evidence.95  The State argued on appeal that the 
corroboration rule “should no longer exist and that the testimony of a victim 
of a sexual offense should be subject to the same standard of review as that of 
any other witness.”96  The court then evaluated the history of the corrobora-
tion rule in its analysis.97  Early Missouri cases had held that appellate courts 
should scrutinize testimony if it seems “too incredible and unsubstantial to be 
the basis of a judgment.”98  Since appellate courts were required to assess the 
weight of a victim’s testimony, “appellate courts reviewed the victim’s testi-
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 664. 
 90. Id. at 672. 
 91. Id. at 673. 
 92. Id. 
 93. State v. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). 
 94. Id. at 289-90 (citing State v. Platt, 496 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1973)); State v. Ellis, 710 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 95. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d at 288. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 288-89. 
 98. Id. at 288 (quoting State v. Goodale, 109 S.W. 9, 11 (Mo. 1908)). 
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mony in detail, making their own assessments of whether the testimony was 
credible and convincing.”99  The court concluded, 
[T]here seems to be no logical basis for a separate rule, even a re-
stricted one, which relates solely to the review of the testimony of a 
victim of a sexual offense.  The standards for reviewing the testimony 
of any witness in a criminal case should be sufficient to assess the tes-
timony of a victim of a sexual offense.100 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern District shared the same 
notion as the Eastern District.101  In State v. Griffith, the court recognized that 
all Missouri appellate courts have criticized the corroboration rule.102  The 
Southern District cited State v. Nelson and the Western District’s decision in 
State v. Peters, which “complained of the ‘inconsistent and sometimes con-
fusing evidentiary and appellate review rules that have evolved in sex offense 
cases,’ [raising] the pertinent ‘question of why the standards used in every 
other case would not be sufficient and preferable.’”103  The Western District 
found no reason for a corroboration rule, but like in State v. Griffith, the court 
continued to apply the corroboration rule because the law had not yet been 
invalidated.104 
B.  The Destructive Contradictions Doctrine 
Both the corroboration rule and the destructive contradictions doctrine 
were first created for use in sexual assault cases because the testimony of 
victims was closely scrutinized and automatically deemed suspect.105  This 
premise was based upon the “admonition of Lord Hale that ‘it must be re-
membered that this is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, 
and harder to be defended by the party accused.’”106  While the evidentiary 
doctrines have an identical genesis, their applications now vary and they are 
no longer considered one and the same.107 
The destructive contradictions doctrine, as applied to sexual assault cas-
es, was an exception to the general rule that corroboration of a victim’s testi-
 
 99. Nelson, 818 S.W.2d at 289. 
 100. Id. 
 101. State v. Griffith, 312 S.W.3d 413, 424 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (quoting State v. Peters, 186 S.W.3d 774, 779-80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 104. Id. at 425. 
 105. State v. Wadel, 398 S.W.3d 68, 79 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated by State 
v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en banc). 
 106. State v. Goodale, 109 S.W. 9, 11 (Mo. 1908); see State v. Burns, 671 S.W.2d 
306, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (explaining the limited applicability of the destructive 
contradictions doctrine, making it harder for the accused to use the doctrine in defend-
ing him or herself). 
 107. Wadel, 398 S.W.3d at 79. 
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mony at trial is not required in order to have sufficient evidence for a convic-
tion.108  It provides that “a witness’s testimony loses probative force when his 
or her statements at trial are so inconsistent, contradictory, and diametrically 
opposed to one another that they rob the testimony of all probative force.”109  
Therefore, a victim’s testimony must be corroborated if it is “‘inherently in-
credible, self-destructive or opposed to known physical facts’ on a vital point 
or element.”110  However, the destructive contradictions doctrine applies to a 
victim’s trial testimony only when it is deemed strikingly contradictory and 
inconsistent to known physical facts.111  The doctrine does not apply to “con-
tradictions between the victim’s trial testimony and prior out-of-court state-
ments, to contradictions as to collateral matters, or to inconsistencies not suf-
ficient to make the testimony inherently self-destructive.”112  The application 
of the destructive contradictions doctrine, as well as the corroboration rule, 
assumed juries were unable to make their own credibility and factual deter-
minations – an issue directly addressed by the Supreme Court of Missouri in 
Porter. 
IV.  THE INSTANT DECISION 
“Generally,” the court noted, “a witness’s testimony is sufficient evi-
dence to sustain a conviction, and the trier of fact is left to determine credibil-
ity issues.”113  In sex crimes, however, Missouri had used a corroboration rule 
that applied when “the victim’s testimony [was] so contradictory and in con-
flict with physical facts, surrounding circumstances, and common experience, 
that its validity [was] thereby rendered doubtful.”114 
In its decision, the court highlighted two fundamental defects warranting 
the corroboration rule’s abolition.115  The court first noted, “[T]he corrobora-
tion rule requires an appellate court to engage in credibility determinations 
that are the province of the trier of fact.”116  Because appellate courts are re-
quired to make credibility determinations, “the corroboration rule is incon-
sistent with the appropriate standard of review for challenges to the sufficien-
cy of the evidence.  That standard is premised on the notion that appellate 
 
 108. State v. Wright, 998 S.W.2d 78, 81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999), abrogated by Por-
ter, 439 S.W.3d 208. 
 109. State v. Goudeau, 85 S.W. 3d 126, 131-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), abrogated 
by Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208. 
 110. State v. Uptegrove, 330 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
T.L.C. v. T.L.C., 950 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)), abrogated by Porter, 
439 S.W.3d 208. 
 111. Uptegrove, 330 S.W.3d at 590. 
 112. Wright, 998 S.W.2d at 81. 
 113. Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 211. 
 114. Id. at 211-12 (quoting State v. Silvey, 894 S.W.2d 662, 673 (Mo. 1995) (en 
banc)). 
 115. Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 212. 
 116. Id. 
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courts are not a ‘super juror’ with the power to override factual determina-
tions supported by sufficient evidence.”117 
Second, the court determined that because the rule only applied to sexu-
al assault cases, the corroboration rule was premised on two false assump-
tions: “(1) that the testimony of sex crime victims is inherently less credible 
than the testimony of other crime victims; and (2) that judges and juries are 
uniquely unable to make accurate factual determinations in sex crime cas-
es.”118  The court determined there is no reason to assume that the factfinder 
in a sex case is any less able to arrive at accurate factual determinations than 
factfinders in other criminal cases.119  Because the corroboration rule required 
Missouri appellate courts to make factual determinations in sex cases that are 
otherwise left to the factfinder, “[t]he corroboration rule [was] abolished in 
Missouri.  Missouri appellate courts reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support a conviction for a sex crime, as in all other cases, will [now] re-
view challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence pursuant to [the] generally 
applicable standard of review.”120 
Similar to the corroboration rule, the destructive contradictions doctrine 
states that “a witness’s testimony ‘loses probative value when his or her 
statements at trial are so inconsistent, contradictory, and diametrically op-
posed to one another that they rob the testimony of all probative force.’”121  
While the destructive contradictions doctrine is not limited only to sex 
crimes, it similarly requires appellate courts to make credibility determina-
tions that are properly left to the factfinder at trial.122 
The court abolished the destructive contradictions doctrine in Missouri 
and, as a result, assessed Porter’s insufficient evidence claim according to the 
usual standard of review concerning the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port a criminal conviction: “determining whether there is sufficient evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt.”123  This standard is not a determination of whether the 
court believes the evidence put on at trial establishes the defendant is guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather is a question of whether a rational fact-
finder “could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reason-
able doubt.”124 
Because the court decided to abolish the corroboration rule and the de-
structive contradictions doctrine, the court did not assess Porter’s claim that 
K.W.’s testimony and out-of-court statements were so contradictory that they 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 212-13. 
 121. Id. at 213 (quoting State v. Uptegrove, 330 S.W.3d 586, 590 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2011)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 211, 213. 
 124. Id. at 211 (quoting State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. 2011) (en 
banc)). 
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could not constitute substantive evidence.125  Instead, the court determined 
that the “inconsistencies in K.W.’s testimony [did] not render the evidence 
insufficient.”126  The court reasoned that the jury was in the best position to 
determine any credibility issues raised against K.W., and “[t]he jury resolved 
the inconsistencies in the context of evidence that placed K.W., without 
pants, alone with a shirtless Porter in his room with his head between her 
legs, engaging in activity that the Grandmother witnessed and described in 
terms consistent with oral sex.”127  Because this evidence must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial (the State) and because 
of the abolition of the corroboration rule and the destructive contradictions 
doctrine, the court held there “was sufficient evidence to permit a rational 
fact-finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Porter touched K.W.’s gen-
itals with his hand and with his tongue.”128 
As to Porter’s argument that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to 
review K.W.’s videotaped CAC interview as often as jurors wished, the court 
affirmed the court of appeals’ determination and held that “in the absence of 
any record showing what occurred at the trial level related to this claimed 
error, the Court on appeal is obligated to affirm the trial court.”129  Because 
the record did not demonstrate whether Porter objected to the trial court’s 
decision to permit the jury to view the tapes, Porter’s claim was unpreserved 
and speculative and could not “serve as a basis for reversing the judgment of 
conviction.”130 
V.  COMMENT 
There is no question that the Supreme Court of Missouri’s choice to 
abolish the corroboration rule and destructive contradictions doctrine was a 
good decision.131  State v. Porter represents the court’s stand to abolish sexist 
evidentiary rules that placed doubt on a sexual assault victim who chose to 
testify and that effectively put that victim on trial before a scrutinizing jury 
and panel of appellate judges.  The Porter decision reflects the truth that the 
testimony of victims of sexual assaults, who are often female,132 is no less 
credible than the testimony of victims of any other crime.  No state retains the 
general corroboration rule exhibited in Sibley, which requires evidence in 
addition to a victim’s testimony in order to secure a conviction for sexual 
 
 125. Id. at 213. 
 126. Id. at 214. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 215 (quoting State v. Naucke, 829 S.W.2d 445, 460 (Mo. 1992) (en 
banc)). 
 130. Id. at 214-15. 
 131. Id. at 213. 
 132. See Female Victims of Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 6, http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fvv.pdf (last updated Oct. 23, 2009). 
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss2/13
2015] A VICTORY FOR VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT? 621 
assault.133  Although Porter has eliminated the role of the appellate courts as 
a “super juror,” the decision will have little effect on the weight actual jurors 
give victim testimony.134  While use of the corroboration rule has virtually 
vanished, more must be done to eliminate its continued application by juries 
and to eliminate the gender and sex norms that continue to pervade court-
rooms across Missouri and the United States. 
A.  The Effect of the Corroboration Rule and the Call for Abolishment 
As stated in Porter, the corroboration rule assumes: (1) that the testimo-
ny of victims of sexual assault is less credible than the testimony of victims 
of other crimes and (2) that judges and juries are ill-suited to make factual 
determinations in sexual assault cases.135  The doubt attributed to sexual as-
sault victims’ testimony is evident when considering that a conviction for the 
crime of robbery would be upheld as long as the jury found the defendant’s 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of whether the robbery victim’s 
testimony was corroborated.136  In contrast, a victim of sexual assault would 
have no remedy unless other evidence corroborated her testimony at trial.137  
As the Supreme Court of Idaho stated, as cited in Porter, “[t]here should be 
no different rule in a rape case from any other criminal case, since it falls 
within no exception.”138 
The corroboration rule suggests that “if a woman were really raped, she 
would have corroborating evidence of the assault [and,] therefore, her failure 
to produce corroboration means that she was not really raped.”139  The cor-
roboration rule and the latter contention effectively built barriers to the suc-
cessful prosecution of sexual assaults and placed extreme doubt on a victim’s 
credibility.140  As discussed in Part III of this Note, this doubt was apparent in 
Missouri’s archaic and patriarchal application of the corroboration rule.  
These cases reflected that an “unchaste” history affected a victim’s propensity 
to tell the truth and that any past conduct not in accord with what men ex-
pected of a victim of sexual assault served to make the victim’s testimony 
 
 133. Patricia J. Falk, “Because Ladies Lie”: Eliminating Vestiges of the Corrobo-
ration and Resistance Requirements from Ohio’s Sexual Offenses, 62 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 343, 349 (2014). 
 134. See Porter, 439 S.W.3d at 212. 
 135. Id. 
 136. State v. Byers, 627 P.2d 788, 792 (Idaho 1981). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 
84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 979 (2004). 
 140. Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 
590 (2009). 
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inherently contradictory.141  According to Professor Maria Bevacqua, rules 
like the corroboration rule and destructive contradictions doctrine codified 
“both the distrust of women’s charges and widely held assumptions about the 
significance of a woman’s [chastity].”142 
The corroboration rule served as a hurdle for successful convictions of 
sexual assault because “the corroboration rule, in effect, arbitrarily single[d] 
out victims of sex offenses as a class whose credibility [was] immediately 
suspect.”143  Sexual assaults by their very nature make corroborating evidence 
difficult to obtain.144  Determining whether a sexual assault took place often 
turns solely on the conflicting testimony of the victim and the defendant, 
leaving the factfinder to resolve a “he-said-she-said” dilemma.145  The cor-
roboration rule required evidence beyond the victim’s report of the sexual 
assault and her testimony at trial.146  Examples of corroborating evidence 
included physical injuries from the assault, torn clothing, and other evidence 
of a struggle.147 
Evidence of violence and physical injury is relatively uncommon in 
sexual assaults.148  Many sexual assaults do not involve a physical fight be-
tween the attacker and the victim and many attackers are able to subdue vic-
tims through verbal coercion, unknown consumption of a “date rape” drug, or 
because the victim is “frozen with fear.”149  While the prosecution of sexual 
assaults presents issues very different from many other crimes, these differ-
ences do not warrant the level of doubt victims must overcome in order for 
justice to be served and their attackers convicted. 
B.  The Corroboration Rule and Sexual Assault Evidentiary Doctrines 
The corroboration rule and destructive contradictions doctrine were just 
two evidentiary doctrines that made proving the crime of rape and the deci-
sion to pursue criminal charges even more difficult for victims.  Victims also 
had to overcome additional rules that were unique to sexual assault, such as 
the prompt complaint requirement, the utmost resistance requirement, the 
 
 141. See State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895) (en banc); see also State v. 
Patrick, 17 S.W. 666, 670 (Mo. 1891). 
 142. MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA: FEMINISM AND THE 
POLITICS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 89 (2000). 
 143. Byers, 627 P.2d at 791. 
 144. See generally id. (attributing the difficulty in corroborating sex assaults to the 
lack of eye witnesses, the conditioned response of women when faced with an aggres-
sive assailant to not resist, and in certain cases, the lack of physical bruising and po-
tentially the closeness of the relationship between the assailant and the victim). 
 145. Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1365, 1382 (1972). 
 146. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1138-39 (1986). 
 147. Anderson, supra note 139, at 979. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. at 980. 
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marital rape exemption, and a virtual chastity requirement.150  These rules, 
along with the absence of rape shield laws, 
reflected age-old prejudices and unfair, pervasive doubts about the 
credibility of any woman who claimed to have been raped.  When a 
woman did decide to confront the criminal justice system and pursue 
criminal charges against her attacker, she was met with obstacles that 
the legal system had put into place to thwart a fair resolution of her 
charges.  The law wouldn’t accept her word alone, and even though 
rapes are almost always done in a private setting with no witnesses 
present, corroboration was required.151 
The culmination of these doctrines resulted in few successful convic-
tions for rape and led to a relatively low number of reports of assaults.152  
Women felt as if they were met with disbelief and opposition at every stage 
of prosecution.153  The varying evidentiary doctrines proved to be a substan-
tial burden, often acting interdependent of each other; a prompt complaint 
might serve as corroborating evidence or a lack of corroborating evidence 
might trigger a cautionary instruction, warning factfinders of Lord Hale’s 
belief that accusations of rape were easy to make and difficult to refute.154 
In an effort to alleviate some of the burden victims faced, feminists lob-
bied for legal reforms in the mid-1970s and 1980s, an era commonly referred 
to as the “second-wave” of feminist reform.155  This movement reflected an 
effort to reform the chauvinistic laws regarding sexual assault and to educate 
the public about stereotypes surrounding such laws and the evolution of sex 
and gender norms.156  Reform indicated a serious effort “to increase the pros-
ecution, conviction, and punishment for rape,” and, in turn, encourage victims 
to report sexual assaults.157  These efforts proved to be largely successful 
because state and federal legislatures “enacted rape shield laws, provided for 
privileged protection of rape counseling records, repealed marital rape excep-
tions, eliminated evidentiary corroboration requirements and cautionary in-
 
 150. Id. at 953-54. 
 151. Richard Klein, An Analysis of Thirty-Five Years of Rape Reform: A Frustrat-
ing Search for Fundamental Fairness, 41 AKRON L. REV. 981, 1051-52 (2008). 
 152. Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed 
Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 127, 146 
(2001). 
 153. See id. at 148. 
 154. Anderson, supra note 139, at 948, 954; see State v. Wadel, 398 S.W.3d 68, 
78 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013), abrogated by State v. Porter, 439 S.W.3d 208 (Mo. 2014) (en 
banc). 
 155. Gruber, supra note 140, at 591-92. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Wells & Motley, supra note 152, at 129. 
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structions regarding the absence of corroboration, and abolished the mistake 
of fact defense.”158 
C.  State v. Porter Is Not Enough 
Common law corroboration requirements codified archaic and patriar-
chal notions about women and sexuality.  Evidentiary doctrines mirrored 
“classic rape myths” and were effective obstacles to the successful reporting 
and subsequent prosecution of sexual assaults.159  While the corroboration 
rule has virtually disappeared from the vast majority of jurisdictions, the rule 
continues to pervade trials because jurors continue to require evidence of 
corroboration in order to convict despite abolition of the formal require-
ment.160  Notwithstanding the best efforts of reform, there is little evidence to 
suggest that there has been significant change in the criminal justice sys-
tem.161  Sexual assaults remain prevalent and successful prosecutions rare; 
data suggests that “less than ten percent of all sexual assault assailants will be 
convicted for their crime.”162 
“Rape myths” is the term given to beliefs that a victim brought on her 
own assault or was at fault for the attack because of her behavior or charac-
ter.163  It is true that “both men and women in our society have long accepted 
norms of male aggressiveness and female passivity which lead to a restricted 
understanding of rape.”164  Professor Morrison Torrey of DePaul University 
College of Law identifies common rape myths such as: 
women mean “yes” when they say “no”; women are “asking for it” 
when they wear provocative clothes, go to bars alone, or simply walk 
down the street at night; only virgins can be raped; women are venge-
ful, bitter creatures “out to get men”; if a woman says “yes” once, 
there is no reason to believe her “no” the next time; women who 
“tease” men deserve to be raped; the majority of women who are 
raped are promiscuous or have bad reputations; a woman who goes to 
the home of a man on the first date implies she is willing to have sex; 
women cry rape to cover up an illegitimate pregnancy.165 
 
 158. Francis X. Shen, How We Still Fail Rape Victims: Reflecting on Responsibil-
ity and Legal Reform, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 54 (2011). 
 159. See Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea 
of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1040 (1991). 
 160. Gruber, supra note 140, at 597-98. 
 161. Shen, supra note 158, at 7-8. 
 162. Id. at 8. 
 163. Id. at 14-15, 19. 
 164. Estrich, supra note 146, at 1093. 
 165. Torrey, supra note 159, at 1014-15. 
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These rape myths can develop through the influence of family and 
friends, the media, and life experiences.166  These notions about women and 
rape have been refuted by collected data time and time again, but some of 
these beliefs are so engrained in jurors and society that some jurors will con-
tinue to apply the corroboration doctrine de facto, despite the fact that Mis-
souri has abolished the rule de jure.167  As Professor Torrey states, these rape 
myths “continue to play an important role in the way judges, juries, and oth-
ers perceive testimony in rape trials.”168 
Societal change can often be initiated in the courts, but reformation of 
the law regarding sexual assaults has not yet led to the fundamental changes 
needed to replace widely held rape myths with rape truths.  While over three 
decades have passed since second-wave reform, evidence of belief in rape 
myths and archaic notions about corroboration persist.  Examples are preva-
lent in the media.  Former U.S. Senate candidate for Missouri, Todd Akin, 
may infamously be remembered for his explanation of his stance against 
abortions for women whose rape resulted in pregnancy: “If it’s a legitimate 
rape, the female body has ways to try to shut that whole thing down.”169  
Some commentators believed these comments would actually help Akin’s 
political career.170  In the fall of 2014, Robert R. Jennings, then President of 
Lincoln University of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, spoke at an all-
women’s convocation.171  At this convocation, Jennings responded to concern 
regarding the incidence of sexual assault on campus: “[W]e had, on this cam-
pus last semester three cases of young women who after having done whatev-
er they did with young men and then it didn’t turn out the way they wanted it 
to turn out, guess what they did?  They went to Public Safety and said, ‘He 
raped me.’”172 
These examples reflect the beliefs of some men, and even some educat-
ed men, in modern times.  While Todd Akin and Robert R. Jennings are rela-
tively public figures, they are among the pool of potential jurors that may be 
left to decide whether a sexual assault took place and whether to convict.  
Jurors’ beliefs reflect the attitudes the community has toward women and 
sexual assault, and it is the “very lack of knowledge about the reality of rape 
that allows citizens in general and jurors in particular to believe in rape 
 
 166. Shen, supra note 158, at 22. 
 167. See id. at 24-25. 
 168. Torrey, supra note 159, at 1015. 
 169. John Eligon & Michael Schwirtz, Senate Candidate Provokes Ire with “Le-
gitimate Rape” Comment, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/08/20/us/politics/todd-akin-provokes-ire-with-legitimate-rape-
comment.html?_r=0. 
 170. See id. 
 171. Susan Snyder, A College President’s Words to Young Women About Men, 
PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-11-10/news/56395
067_1_young-women-college-president-jennings. 
 172. Id. 
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myths.”173  As Professor Susan Estrich noted in 1986, “Statutes and appellate 
court opinions provide a background for the way rape is defined in practice 
within the criminal justice system.  But on a day-to-day basis, the critical 
decisions are not made by the legislators or the appellate judges, but by the 
actors within the system.”174  When jurors sit in the jury box, they bring their 
life experiences and long-held beliefs with them.175  Unfortunately, some 
jurors may subscribe to the rape myths reflected in the corroboration rule and 
destructive contradictions doctrine and allow these beliefs to circumvent the 
law.  Additionally, when a juror accepts a rape myth as truth, prosecutors face 
an even higher burden in achieving justice.176 
In order to eradicate the lingering sexist implications of the corrobora-
tion rule and other abolished evidentiary doctrines, reform efforts should be 
focused on educating potential jurors.  Future jurors need to be educated on 
rape and the truth regarding the ranging demographics of rape victims and 
different kinds of rapists and must realize that no characteristic or behavior of 
a victim means she is “deserving” of an assault.  Voir dire is the first oppor-
tunity prosecutors have to begin educating potential jurors about rape myths 
and truths.177  Voir dire allows prosecutors to identify and strike potential 
jurors whose biases may affect their ability to follow the law.178  A goal for 
prosecutors in jury selection is “to delve into juror rape myth acceptance and 
begin to redefine [those] problematic beliefs into juror competence.”179   
Prosecutors may want to ask whether potential jurors would be less likely to 
convict if they knew that the defendant and victim had some sort of relation-
ship, whether it be romantic or platonic, or if the potential jurors would be 
able to follow the judge’s instructions (now void of any remnant of the cor-
roboration rule and destructive contradictions doctrine) despite their personal 
beliefs.  Education of potential jurors needs to begin in voir dire and continue 
throughout trial in an effort to eliminate the consideration of rape myths and 
to completely abolish the corroboration rule and destructive contradictions 
doctrine from sexual assault prosecutions.180 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While the abolition of the corroboration rule and destructive contradic-
tions doctrine was legally sound, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s decision in 
 
 173. Torrey, supra note 159, at 1049. 
 174. Estrich, supra note 146, at 1161. 
 175. See Christopher Mallios & Toolsi Meisner, Educating Juries in Sexual As-
sault Cases, STRATEGIES 2, July 2010, available at http://www.aequitasresource.org/
EducatingJuriesInSexualAssaultCasesPart1.pdf. 
 176. Id. at 1. 
 177. See id. at 6. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 2. 
 180. See id. at 6. 
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State v. Porter may not lead to its desired effect for some time.  Missouri has 
made the conscious decision to bar sexist evidentiary doctrines from its court-
rooms and has, at least facially, equalized the weight of victim testimony in 
sexual assault cases to the testimony of victims in all other criminal cases.  
Still, more than just the law needs to change.  Members of society make up 
the juries who are entrusted with determining whether the State has proven, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that a crime has taken place.  Many potential jury 
members maintain misconceptions and myths about sexual assault, its vic-
tims, and its perpetrators.  More needs to be done to educate the public at 
large in order to fully eradicate the corroboration rule, destructive contradic-
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